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Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau 
 
A.C. Pritchard 
University of Michigan Law School 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.1 
marked the resurgence of the SEC in the Supreme Court, sparking a decade-long winning 
streak there. The Capital Gains decision, although turning on an interpretation of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,2 also gave the green light to the SEC to push the 
boundaries of its power in other areas. Moreover, Capital Gains suggested that the SEC 
could expand its power through agency and judicial interpretation of existing statutes and 
regulation, without resorting to the cumbersome rulemaking process under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, or still more daunting, seeking legislation. After its victory 
in Capital Gains, the SEC would push an aggressive interpretation of § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act in the lower courts, particularly the Second Circuit, to crack down on 
insider trading.  This Chapter uncovers the seeds of the SEC’s insider trading crusade in 
Capital Gains and how that opinion influenced subsequent securities jurisprudence. 
I proceed as follows. Section I provides background on the SEC and its 
relationship with the Supreme Court prior to Capital Gains. Section II follows the SEC’s 
Capital Gains enforcement action as it made its way up through the district court and the 
                                                 
1 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
2 54 Stat. 847, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. 
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Second Circuit. Section III explores how the case unfolded in the Supreme Court. Section 
IV then assesses Capital Gains’ long-term impact. A brief Conclusion follows.  
I. Background 
A generation before the Capital Gains decision, the fledgling SEC had put itself 
at the center of the nation’s political discourse. A voting public weary of the deprivation 
and misery of the Great Depression cheered as the SEC went after the Wall Street fat 
cats. William O. Douglas catapulted to national prominence during the New Deal as 
chairman of the SEC by bringing the New York Stock Exchange to heel in the wake of 
Richard Whitney scandal.3 The SEC stayed in the headlines during its long fight to 
dismantle the giant public utility empires under the mandate of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act (“PUHCA”). The agency enjoyed an enviable record of success in the high 
court, losing only two out of thirteen PUHCA cases decided;4 overall, the agency lost 
only three cases out of twenty-five between 1936 and 1955.5 After the Supreme Court 
decided the last of that string of PUHCA cases, the SEC’s involvement in cases at the 
                                                 
3 Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill 136-154 (2003). 
4 SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943); American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 325 
U.S. 385 (1945). The Chenery I defeat was essentially undone by the Court four years later when the case 
returned to the Court. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Engineers Public Service v. SEC, 
332 U.S. 788 (1947), was rendered moot by a settlement. 
5 The SEC’s additional loss was Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). This decision pre-dated Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal transformation of the Court. 
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Court took a marked decline. The Court decided only three securities cases of any kind 
between 1956 and 1960; two of those were per curiam.6 
That dearth of securities litigation reflected the SEC's diminished role.7 By the 
1950s, the public utilities had been brought low and the campaign to tame Wall Street 
was a rapidly fading memory. The SEC was no longer the prominent political actor that it 
had been in the 1930s under the leadership of Douglas. World War II, which saw 
government and business join hands in the effort to defeat the totalitarian threats of 
Germany and Japan, reduced the SEC to a political afterthought. The agency, deemed 
“non-essential” to the war effort, saw itself downsized and exiled to Philadelphia, not to 
return to Washington until 1948. The agency's return from exile did not signal a return to 
relevance. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations had other political priorities, and 
the SEC Chairmen appointed by those presidents were not fueled by the ambition that 
had driven Douglas in that role a generation earlier. 
The 1960s – and the election of John F. Kennedy – marked the beginning of a 
new era for the administrative agencies and a rejuvenated SEC. Kennedy called on James 
Landis – a New Deal SEC chairman – to draft a report outlining reforms for the 
administrative agencies.8 Landis urged that more money be allocated to the SEC, but 
more generally, he called for rejuvenated leadership by “gradually restaffing [the 
                                                 
6 SEC v. La. Pub. Ser. Comm'n, 353 U.S. 368 (1957) (per curiam); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Dyer v. SEC, 359 U.S. 499 (1959) (per curiam). 
7 See generally Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 241-289 (3rd Ed. 2003). 
8 James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect (December 1960). 
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agencies] with men who, because of their competence and their desire to fulfill the 
legislative mandates described in the basic statutes establishing these agencies, will 
inspire a sense of devotion to and pride in the public service by their many employees.”9 
At the SEC, the new leadership called for by Landis came in the form of William 
Cary. The Columbia corporate law professor was Kennedy’s second choice, called upon 
after Harvard’s Louis Loss, the dean of securities scholars, had turned Kennedy down.10 
Despite being Kennedy’s second choice, Cary had strong links to the SEC’s New Deal 
glory days: Cary had been a student in one of Professor William O. Douglas’s last 
corporate finance classes, and he later went to work for Chairman Douglas at the SEC.11  
Things were going to happen at the SEC on Cary’s watch; Cary signaled his intent 
to push the agency in a more activist direction shortly after his arrival. Cary's opinion for 
the Commission in Cady, Roberts & Co. 12  announced in unmistakable fashion the 
agency's newfound commitment to interpreting broadly its statutory mandate.  In Cady, 
Roberts, the Commission interpreted Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act to prohibit insider 
trading. Rule 10b-5 had been adopted by the Commission three decades earlier under its 
§ 10(b) authority as a general anti-fraud prohibition, but the rule (and statute) makes no 
mention of insider trading. Notwithstanding this omission, the SEC found in Cady, 
Roberts that the partner of a brokerage firm had violated Rule 10b-5 when he traded on 
                                                 
9 Id. at 1. Of direct relevance to Capital Gains, Landis called for greater regulation of investment 
advisers, “many of whom have morals not exceeding those of tipsters at the race track.” Id. at 33. 
10 Seligman, supra note 7, at 291. 
11 Id. at 293. 
12 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
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non-public information. The partner had learned, in his role as a director of a public 
company, that the company was planning to cut the size of its dividend. In concluding 
that the partner had violated Rule 10b-5, Cary set out a broad standard for the insider 
trading prohibition:  
The obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, 
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of 
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.13 
These elements are conspicuously absent from the text of either Rule 10b-5 or § 10(b).  
Cary gave notice that in interpreting “the[] elements [of § 10(b)] under the broad 
language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions 
and rigid classifications.” 14  Thus, Cary announced the SEC’s intent to root out 
information asymmetries in the secondary markets to protect “the buying public” “from 
the misuse of special information.”15 The securities laws would be interpreted as needed 
to achieve that goal; statutory literalism would not be an impediment. But Cary’s broad 
vision of the SEC’s authority had not yet been validated by a court. The respondents in 
Cady, Roberts did not seek review of the agency’s order, so it remained to be seen 
whether Cary’s novel interpretation of § 10(b) would withstand judicial scrutiny. 
There were potential landmines waiting for the SEC’s insider trading initiative. 
Just a month after the SEC handed down Cady, Roberts the SEC argued before the 
                                                 
13 Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 913. 
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Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman.16 Blau involved the interpretation of the “short-swing” 
profits rule of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Despite the focus on insider trading during 
the hearings that led to the adoption of the Exchange Act, § 16(b) is the only Exchange 
Act provision, as it was adopted by Congress in 1934, that deals explicitly with insider 
trading.  
The facts of Blau bore some similarities to Cady, Roberts. At issue was whether 
the knowledge of a Lehman Brothers partner, Thomas, who was serving as a director of a 
public company, Tide Water, could be attributed to the investment bank.17 If Lehman was 
charged with Thomas’s knowledge, then the bank’s profits from trading in Tide Water’s 
stock would be subject to disgorgement. The district court found that Thomas had not 
shared his knowledge of Tide Water’s affairs with his Lehman partners.18   
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision over the dissent of Judge Charles 
Clark.19 Clark plays a central role in our tale, and his background suggested that he would 
be predisposed to the SEC’s arguments. Clark was the former dean of the Yale Law 
School, where he had been a colleague of William O. Douglas. Clark, like Douglas, was a 
committed New Dealer.20 Moreover, he had worked for the SEC part time for a brief 
                                                 
16 368 U.S. 403 (1962). 
17 Id. at 404-406. 
18 Id. at 407. 
19 Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1960), and id. at 793 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
20 Clark was best known as the architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been 
adopted in 1938 when Clark was serving as the head of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee. Charles E. 
Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied in 
Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976 (1937). 
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period at Douglas’s behest.21 The two remained friends22 notwithstanding a falling out 
when Douglas persuaded Clark to endorse Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan while Douglas 
remained silent.23 In fact, Clark had hoped that Douglas would succeed him as dean at 
Yale, but that hope was dashed by Douglas’s appointment to the Supreme Court.24 
Clark’s judicial philosophy, like Douglas’s, allowed plenty of room for judges to chart a 
novel course: “We need the unprincipled decision, i.e., the unprecedented and novel 
decision ... to mark judicial progress.”25  
Clark’s Blau dissent stressed that the courts should defer to the SEC.  When the 
case was initially decided, he fretted that the SEC’s views were not solicited.26 After the 
decision came down, the SEC petitioned for leave to participate as amicus and to file a 
petition for rehearing, and Clark lobbied hard to have the case heard.27 When the petition 
was denied, Clark was nearly apoplectic. He complained that the majority’s opinion 
“leaves this important area of the law almost ludicrously uncertain. ... My own criticisms 
                                                 
21 Seligman, supra note 7, at 111. 
22 William O. Douglas, Charles E. Clark, 73 Yale L.J. 3, 3 (1963).  
23 Murphy, supra note 3, at 129.  
24 Letter from Charles Clark to Arthur B. Darling, (3/20/39), Charles E. Clark Papers, Series I, 
Box 1, Folder 2, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives (hereinafter Clark Papers) (“There was 
one blow to my plans which came in today when bill Douglas was named to the Supreme Court, for I had 
expected, as seemed rather likely, that he would succeed me as dean.”).  In this same letter, Clark was 
rather prescient in predicting that Douglas would chafe under the confines of the bench. Id. (“Douglas is 
one of the ablest and sincerest persons I know, and it is a grand thing to have so young and vigorous a 
person on the bench, unless indeed one believes that could have done more elsewhere.  ... It is hard to think 
of so vigorous a personality as Douglas confined so young.”). 
25 Charles E. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 Va. L.Rev. 660, 665 (1963). 
26 Blau, 286 F.2d at 796 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would seem to me that at least before we 
dispose of this vastly important issue we should ask the S.E.C. for its informed comments.”). 
27 Memo of Charles Clark to J.E.L., S.R.W., L.P.M., H.J.F., J.J.S., (1/13/1961), Clark Papers, 
Series II, Box 45, Folder 186, (“May I suggest that, even if some of our colleagues do not want the real 
help the Commission can give here, I do feel some surprise and chagrin that they are willing to prevent 
those who do from receiving it.”). 
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uttered in my dissent have remained unanswered and have now, as is apparent, the 
support of the S.E.C.”28 Worse yet, the Second Circuit’s rule built “unfair discrimination” 
“into an important remedial statute—a discrimination substantially eliminating the great 
Wall Street trading firms from the statute’s operations.”29 
Clark’s populist tone evidently struck a chord with the Supreme Court, as seven 
justices voted to grant certiorari.30 When Blau came to the Supreme Court, the SEC, 
alongside its allies in the plaintiffs’ bar, urged that § 16(b) be read broadly “on policy 
grounds.”31  According to the SEC, Thomas’s knowledge should be attributed to the 
partnership and Lehman Brothers “should be held liable even though it is neither a 
director, officer, nor a 10% stockholder.” 32  The agency’s argument was weakened, 
however, by its concession “that such an interpretation is not justified by the literal 
language of § 16(b).” 33  The Court noted the breadth of the SEC’s argument: “The 
argument of ... the Commission seems to go so far as to suggest that § 16(b)’s forfeiture 
of profits should be extended to include all persons realizing ‘short swing’ profits who 
either act on the basis of ‘inside’ information or have the possibility of ‘inside’ 
                                                 
28 Blau,  286 F.2d at 799 (Clark, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc). 
29 Id. 
30 Blau v. Lehman, No. 66, Docket Sheet (April 21, 1961) (“Grant: All but Stewart and Black who 
voted to deny.”), Earl Warren Collection, Box 375, Library of Congress.  
31 Blau, 368 U.S. at 410. 
32 Id. at 410-411. 
33 Id. at 411. 
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information.”34 Shades of Cady, Roberts? The SEC’s preferred construction would have 
broadened § 16(b) to make it a general prohibition against insider trading. 
The Court, while acknowledging the SEC’s “persuasive policy arguments that the 
[Exchange] Act should be broadened in this way to prevent ‘the unfair use of 
information’ more effectively,” declined the SEC’s invitation to ignore § 16’s 
language. 35 Amending the statute, according to the Court majority, was not its job: 
“Congress can and might amend § 16(b) if the Commission would present to it the policy 
arguments it has presented to us, but we think that Congress is the proper agency to 
change an interpretation of the Act unbroken since its passage, if the change is to be 
made.”36 In other words, lofty policy goals would not allow an end run around plain 
statutory text. The Court insisted on adherence to the statutory text despite an 
impassioned dissent from the Court’s resident securities expert, Justice Douglas, who 
echoed Clark’s moralistic tone. Douglas complained that the majority had “sanction[ed], 
as vested, a practice so notoriously unethical as profiting on inside information.”37 For 
the SEC, the Blau opinion offered scant hope that the Supreme Court would be receptive 
to the free-ranging method of statutory interpretation deployed by Chairman Cary in 
Cady, Roberts. 
II. The district court and Second Circuit  
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 413.  
37 Id. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
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The SEC had not yet launched its campaign against insider trading when it 
brought an enforcement action against Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. and its 
owner, Harry P. Schwarzmann.38 The facts of the case placed it in the nebulous area 
between pure omissions and misleading half-truths. Capital Gains published a newsletter, 
“Capital Gains Report,” which it distributed to approximately 5,000 subscribers. The 
newsletter highlighted a number of stocks in each issue, generally predicting an increase 
in price.39 The SEC alleged that on a number of occasions the defendants had purchased 
shares in the companies recommended in advance of the distribution of the newsletter.40 
The stocks increased in price and trading volume after the distribution of the newsletter 
and Capital Gains liquidated its positions within a week or two thereafter.41 The SEC 
argued that the failure by Capital Gains to disclose its purchases and subsequent sales 
violated § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful (1) “to employ 
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client” or (2) “to 
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or 
deceit upon any client or prospective client.”42 
The district court denied the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
concluding that § 206(1) and (2) used “the words ‘fraud’ and ‘deceit’ ... in their technical 
                                                 
38 A detailed history of the enforcement action can be found in Arthur Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L.Rev. 1051, 1056-59 (2011). 
39 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 182-183. 
40 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 747 (2nd Cir. 1961). In one case, 
Capital Gains had sold short the shares of a company that received a negative recommendation 
41 Id. 
42 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) & (2). 
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sense.”43 The trial court’s use of the word “technical” would come to have important 
implications. What did the court mean by “technical”? Apparently, something close to 
common law notions of deceit. For § 206(2) to be satisfied, the SEC would have to show 
that Capital Gains’ clients had lost money as a result of Capital Gains’ sales. For § 
206(1), to be satisfied, the SEC would have to show that Capital Gains intended to cause 
its clients loss.44 The district court’s discussion ignores the possibility that a fiduciary 
duty might give rise to a duty of disclosure, i.e., equitable notions of fraud like those 
found in the SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision. Instead, the district court read § 206 as 
incorporating traditional common law notions of fraud involving material 
misrepresentations. 
The SEC appealed to the Second Circuit. In a case in which the agency was 
pushing the boundaries of its authority, the panel it drew did not bode well. The panel 
consisted of two Eisenhower appointees, Leonard Moore and Sterry Waterman,45 and the 
lone bright spot for the SEC, Charles Clark, the dissenter in Blau.  
Judge Moore wrote the opinion for the panel upholding the district court’s denial 
of the injunction.46 The SEC won a minor victory with the court’s holding that the district 
court was wrong in requiring the SEC to show actual losses to investors, necessarily 
rejecting the narrowest version of common law fraud in interpreting § 206. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
43 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (1961). 
44 Id. at 899. 
45 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, available at www.fjc.gov. 
46 Capital Gains, 300 F.2d at 746, 751. 
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the majority opinion appeared to require an affirmative misrepresentation by the 
defendant, not simply secret profits: “The test is not gain or loss. It is whether the 
recommendation was honest when made.” 47  How could the court determine if the 
recommendation was honest? As Moore wrote to his colleagues, “the advice may be 
tainted with self-interest, but such a fact cannot be assumed or inferred.  It must be 
established by proof such as deliberate misstatements of fact or belief that a stock had a 
dismal rather than bright future.”48 A dishonest recommendation would be actionable 
under § 206, but undisclosed actions would not be actionable, as long as those actions 
were not inconsistent with that recommendation. 
Were Capital Gains’ purchases and sales inconsistent with its recommendations? 
The SEC urged that “the failure to disclose to clients to whom purchase was 
recommended that they (defendants), too, had made purchases, constituted a scheme to 
defraud by failing to disclose a material fact.”49 What was the material fact? The SEC 
argued that Capital Gains “advice to buy was dishonest and fraudulent” because it failed 
to disclose the advisers’ intention to sell its stock in the near future. 50  This 
characterization of the SEC’s allegation sounds in misleading omission; there is no 
mention of fiduciary duty here. 
                                                 
47 Id. at 749. 
48 Memorandum of LPM, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Oct. 17, 1961), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
49 Capital Gains, 300 F.2d at 747. 
50 Id. at 748. 
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The nature of the SEC’s allegations becomes murky, however, when the court 
concedes that there can be no “serious dispute that a relationship of trust and confidence 
should exist between the adviser and the advised.”51 Does the existence of a fiduciary 
duty alter when a misleading omission becomes actionable? Apparently not; a fiduciary 
duty would not necessarily carry a corresponding disclosure obligation. The duty of trust 
and confidence would be violated only by intentional acts of disloyalty, such as the 
investment adviser’s “failure to disclose that he was being paid to tout a stock.”52 Moore 
distinguished the SEC’s recent Cady, Roberts decision as involving a situation “where 
inside or so-called confidential information was possessed by one party to the transaction 
which was not disclosed to the other.”53 Why that relationship would give rise to an 
affirmative duty of disclosure, while the relationship of an investment adviser to client 
would not, is left unclear in Moore’s opinion. Query why the presence of an affirmative 
statement should preclude a parallel fiduciary duty of disclosure. 
Given the fragility of the distinctions drawn by Moore, his final rationale for the 
court’s decision may have been the most telling: the need for rulemaking.  
[W]hat the SEC would have the court do here is to create a law which Congress 
has never enacted or a regulation which the SEC has never promulgated which, in 
effect, would prohibit investment advisers or their employees from purchasing or 
selling any of the many stocks covered by their services.54   
                                                 
51 Id. at 749. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
13
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The SEC would have disclaimed any inference that its preferred interpretation would 
sweep as broadly as Moore suggested. The uncertainty over the contours of the SEC’s 
interpretation of § 206, however, only reinforced the need for the specificity that a formal 
rulemaking could provide. And rulemaking was certainly feasible; just three days after 
Capital Gains was argued before the appellate judges, the SEC announced a proposal to 
amend its rules under the Investment Advisors Act to require recordkeeping of securities 
transactions by investment advisers and their personnel. 55  If the SEC could require 
recordkeeping, it could require disclosure. 
Judge Waterman also emphasized the need for rulemaking in his memo to his 
colleagues on the panel.  That need was made more acute by Waterman’s perception of 
prevailing industry practice:  
I know of no outfit that discloses what it proposes to do about the stock it or its 
officers may happen to own when it advises you and me what to do with our 
money.  If the SEC wants to go into this field – and perhaps it should – it should 
get out some rules first. 56 
Despite his agreement with Moore on the need for rulemaking, Waterman concurred only 
in the result, offering no rationale for his separate position. 
Judge Moore’s opinion provoked a dissent from Clark that echoed his shrill tone 
in Blau. The majority had “endorse[d] and in effect validate[d] a distressingly low 
standard of business morality,” a result that “top advisers ... not only do not desire, but 
                                                 
55 SEC, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Rel. No. 120, Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 
262. 
56 Memorandum of SRW, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Oct. 19, 1961), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
14
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find rather shocking, in the doubt thus cast upon the good faith and loyalty of their 
profession.” 57  Clark worried about a lemons problem; loyal advisers, argued Clark, 
needed to be safeguarded “against the stigma of unscrupulous tipsters and touts.” 58 
Unlike Moore, Clark placed considerable weight on the conclusion that an investment 
adviser was a fiduciary, whose “first duty ... is loyalty to his beneficiary; if he is engaged 
in feathering his own nest, he cannot be giving his client that wholly disinterested advice 
which it his stock in trade to provide.”59  
The SEC petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was met by dueling memos from 
Clark and Moore. 60  Moore’s position was weakened, however, by the position of 
Waterman, who had only concurred in the original result, apparently because Moore had 
rejected a number of his suggestions.61 That three-way split was sufficient to induce a 
majority in favor of rehearing en banc to clarify the situation.62 Ultimately, only Moore 
voted to deny the petition.63 
What followed was a heated debate among the judges of the Second Circuit on the 
role of statutory interpretation in expanding the boundaries of the securities laws. At oral 
                                                 
57 Capital Gains, 300 F.2d at 751 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 752. 
59 Id. 
60 Memorandum of CEC, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 17, 1962) & Memorandum of 
LPM, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 17, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
61 Memorandum of SRW, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 22, 1962) Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
62 Memorandum of I[rving] R. K[aufman], SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 22, 1962) & 
Memorandum of T[hurgood] M[arshall], SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 22, 1962), Clark Papers, 
Series II, Box 55, Folder 262 (both citing three-way result as reason for granting en banc review). 
63 Order Granting Petition for Rehearing In Banc, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Jan. 23, 1962) 
Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
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argument, Judge Henry Friendly pressed the SEC’s counsel on the history of § 206. If § 
206 was modeled on § 17(a) of the Securities Act, why had Congress omitted the second 
clause of §17(a), which makes it an offense “to obtain money or property by means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading”?64 Judges Waterman and Lumbard wondered why the SEC had 
not adopted “simple rules” requiring disclosure of the trading alleged to be fraudulent, 
while Judge Moore complained of the unfairness of not providing the defendant with 
notice.65 
Clark, seizing the initiative, launched the first memo to his colleagues just two 
days after oral argument.66 He focused on Friendly’s question about the omission from § 
206 of the language from § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. The rationale for its exclusion, 
according to Clark, was that it was unnecessary. Investment advisers do not deal directly 
with their clients, so including a clause relating to obtaining money or property through 
misrepresentation or omission “would have been a waste of ink and effort.”67 Section 206 
was not aimed at common-law deceit of this sort, but rather “to impose fiduciary 
obligations on those who serve as investment advisers.” 68  Clark also rejected the 
argument that the SEC should have promulgated a rule, as “quite frankly judicial 
                                                 
64 Clark Argument Notes, (Feb. 21, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
65 Id. 
66 Supplemental Memo on Rehearing in Banc, CEC, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Feb. 23, 
1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
67 Id. at 3. 
68 Id. at 3-4. 
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legislation amending the statute, since the statute is directly prohibitory.”69 Clark urged 
deference:  
The SEC is indeed unfortunate in having to bring its regulatory processes before 
so conservative as court as ours; I wonder if any other federal appellate court 
would give the Commission a like run-around. I believe we should let it get on 
with its heavy tasks without the kind of judicial harassment it has here received.70 
Clark retained his New Deal faith in the expertise of agencies.  
Friendly, a prominent proponent of agency rulemaking,71 was quick to respond.72 
He echoed Moore and Waterman’s earlier arguments in urging that Congress’s 1960 
amendment of § 206 to add rulemaking authority in subsection (4) allowed “the SEC [to] 
accomplish everything it seeks.”73 In Friendly’s view, both a “device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud” and a “transaction, practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or 
deceit” if “read in their ordinary sense” were lacking – the defendants did not believe that 
their sales would depress the price of the securities to the detriment of their customers.74 
Friendly, like Moore, was looking for badges of intentional fraud. Friendly invoked Blau 
– handed down by the Supreme Court just the month before – as a caution “against 
judicial expansion of provision of the securities laws to accomplish objectives believed to 
                                                 
69 Id. at 4. Clark contrasted § 10(b). Id. at 5 (“When Congress wanted to make a provision not self-
executing, but dependent on the adoption of regulations, it knew how to do it expressly, as if did in § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”). 
70 Id. at 5. 
71 Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definitions of 
Standards (1962). 
72 Memorandum of HJF, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Feb. 26 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
73 Id. at 1. 
74 Id. at 2. 
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salutary.”75 He also scoffed at “the liberal use of such terms as ‘fiduciaries’ –making 
people who sell an advisory service sound like trustees of an express trust.”76 Friendly 
urged that the differences between § 17(a) and § 206 must have had some purpose: 
“nothing could have been easier than to prohibit the giving of advice which contained 
‘any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission’ etc.”77 Indeed, the SEC had 
included similar language when it adopted Rules 10b-5 and 15c 1-2.78 Friendly then went 
on to present an extended history of Congress’s amendment to § 206 in 1960, from which 
he concluded that the power the SEC sought in this case had previously been absent from 
§ 206, but was now available to the agency through rulemaking pursuant to § 206(4).79 
For Friendly, Congress’s omission of “omission” from § 206 had interpretive 
consequences, and labeling the investment adviser a fiduciary could not alter that 
conclusion. 
The other Second Circuit judges quickly picked sides. Deference to regulatory 
agencies had clear ideological overtones and the judges on the Second Circuit were 
closely split – four of the judges (Lumbard, Waterman, Moore, and Friendly) had been 
appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower, one had been appointed by Roosevelt 
(Clark), who had recently been joined by three Kennedy appointees (Irving Kaufman, 
Paul Hays, and Thurgood Marshall). The remaining judge, John Smith, had been 
                                                 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 3. 
78 Id. at 4. 
79 Id. at 5-7. Friendly pointedly chided the SEC for its failure to research this legislative history 
“which the SEC has not ‘had time’ to do in the 15 months this case has been pending.” Id. at 1. 
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appointed to the district court by Roosevelt before being elevated to the appellate court 
by Eisenhower.80  
Clark was quickly joined by Kaufman, Marshall, and Smith in voting to reverse. 
Kaufman was sharply critical of the notion that the SEC should be required to issue 
regulations in advance of enforcement:  
I cannot subscribe to any notion that the S.E.C. is in any way limited in its 
enforcement of Section 206 to the issuance of regulations prior to initiation of 
court action. It has been effectively pointed out that in the area of fraud and 
deception there can be no all-encompassing regulations. The S.E.C. should not be 
required to spell out the activities prohibited by the statutes any more than the 
courts have been made to lay down comprehensive definitions of fraud for 
common law purposes.81 
Marshall’s brief memo rejected the notion that “[r]egulative statutes [could be] 
circumscribed by common law principles.”82 Smith argued that Capital Gains’ trading 
may have influenced the market price,83 or at least that the court should defer to the SEC 
on this point. “That such purchases and sales had some effect upon the market price of 
the securities is vigorously asserted by the commission, an agency presumably possessed 
                                                 
80 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 45. 
81 Memorandum of IRK, SEC v. Capital Gains Research, at 2 (Feb. 27, 1962), Clark Papers, Series 
II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
82 Memorandum of TM, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (Feb. 28, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
83 Memorandum of JJS, SEC v. Capital Gains Research, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1962), Clark Papers, Series 
II, Box 55, Folder 262 (“[I]n each instance of trading by Capital Gains, there is the distinct possibility that 
the concealed purchase, by reducing the presently available shares, may have adversely affect the price paid 
by clients of the service. This is a hidden addition to the fee charged the client. In addition, it may well 
have been true that at least some of the shares sold by Capital Gains were purchased by subscribers or 
others acting upon the recommendation of Capital Gains ...)”). 
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of some expertise in the area and whose views should consequently not lightly be brushed 
aside.”84 
 Soon the tide turned, however, with the remaining judges siding with Friendly. 
Hays was swayed by Friendly’s reading of the legislative history, which persuaded him 
that “Congress did not intend to include in the statute as originally enacted such subtleties 
as this failure to disclose an adverse interest.”85 Waterman wrote at length to explain his 
disagreement with Moore’s original opinion and reasons for voting to affirm.86 Waterman 
disagreed with Moore’s original opinion because he thought “Capital Gains’ advice 
might well affect the price of stock,” but Moore declined to delete the opinion’s 
discussion suggesting that a market effect was unlikely.87 Waterman nonetheless voted to 
affirm, disagreeing with Clark on the ethical issues: “I think it inevitable that an honest 
man honestly advising someone who is paying him for the advice is also entitled to 
handle his own private affairs as he chooses.”88 He was also skeptical of the SEC’s 
understanding of market customs. “The releases of no advisory services known to me, the 
SEC lawyer to the contrary notwithstanding, discloses in any way what the corporation or 
its officers or its directors intend to do about the stock they recommend, or what holdings 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Memorandum of PRH, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (March 1, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
86 Memorandum of SRW, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (March 1, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 Id. 
20
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 68 [2012]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/68
21 
 
are owned in that stock by it or them.”89 Capital Gains trading was not fraudulent, in 
Waterman’s view, “but instead, at the worst ... a device by which Capital Gains could 
make a dollar for itself without costing its clients anything.”90 Waterman was not inclined 
to defer to the SEC on questions of practice in the securities industry. Given this 
“common practice” he concluded “that the stock transactions of the defendant were not 
clearly fraudulent or clearly a breach of trust by it to its subscribers.”91 Accordingly, “this 
proceeding ... should not have been brought until after the promulgation of a rule.”92 The 
day after Waterman circulated his memo, Moore wrote tersely, “I vote to affirm.”93 With 
the court split 4-4, Lumbard, the chief judge weighed in, voting to affirm.94  
Only after all the votes were in was the SEC heard from again.  Judge Friendly 
had inquired of the SEC’s counsel why there was no analogue to § 17(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act in § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. The SEC’s response to Friendly’s 
                                                 
89 Id. See also id. at 4 (“I think what the defendant did in this case is less odious than the acts 
committed by losing defendants in the earlier cases involving parallel sections of the security acts. One 
reason for my belief is that all large investment advisers as well as large brokers and dealers regularly trade 
in the securities about which they advise or in which they deal. Secondly, it seems to be the custom of the 
trade for even brokers merely to state they ‘may or may not have a position in the securities which they 
recommend.’”). Indeed, Waterman believed that purchasing ahead of the recommendation was validation 
that the recommendation was bona fide: “a purchaser of an advisory service would not think much the 
advisory service or the person running it if the advisory service personnel would not buy if the 
recommendation was to buy.” Id. at 2. 
90 Id. at 1. 
91 Id. at 4. 
92 Id. at 6. 
93 Memorandum of LPM, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (March 1, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
94 Memorandum of JEL, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (March 7, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
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question was essentially, “We don’t know.”95 Oddly enough, this response failed to sway 
any of the judges in the majority. Nor did Clark’s personal lobbying of Hays in an effort 
to bring him back to the side of the Democratic appointees.96  
All that remained was the drafting of a new opinion. This was a somewhat 
delicate matter as Moore’s initial effort had drawn little support from his colleagues. 
Moore returned to the drawing board with instructions from Lumbard to incorporate the 
views of Friendly in his opinion.97 Moore cut the objectionable discussions relating to the 
standard for an injunction and the materiality of the alleged omissions. 98  He added 
Friendly’s rendition of the legislative history,99 as well as Blau’s caution “against the 
excessive judicial expansion of provisions of the securities laws to accomplish objectives 
believe to be salutary.”100 
Clark’s new dissent praised the securities laws extravagantly: “this legislation was 
brilliantly successful in responding to a genuine social need. It is a prime demonstration 
of the capacity of a democratic government to meet a social crisis skillfully and 
                                                 
95 Letter of David Ferber, Associate General Counsel of the SEC to the Second Circuit, SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau (March 6, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
96 Note from Charles E. Clark to Paul Hays (March 28, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, 
Folder 262 (“Perhaps my greatest trouble is your reliance on H.J.F.’s memo—which I’m afraid I must hold 
the most specious of the lot.  There is just nothing to rest on in his excursions into legisl. history—
unfortunately a smoke screen.”). 
97 Memorandum of JEL, SEC v. Capital Gains Research (March 7, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, 
Box 55, Folder 262. 
98 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 608 (2nd Cir. 1962) (en banc). 
99 Id. at 609-611. 
100 Id. at 609 (citing Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962)). 
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positively.”101 The majority’s opinion, however, “comes as a real shock” that would 
“scuttle the last of these highly useful statutes and leave it as but a shell.” 102  The 
securities laws, urged Clark, should be “liberally construed to effectuate the broad 
remedial purpose of the acts.”103 Clark also criticized the majority’s reliance on the 1960 
amendments to § 206: “To determine the intention of Congress of 1940 we must look 
backwards from the date of passage, not forwards.”104 And he rejected the suggestion that 
the SEC could reach the defendants’ conduct through rulemaking: “the hope of regulation 
which will require Capital Gains to meet appropriate fiduciary standards not contained in 
the statute is illusory indeed.”105 
Clark forwarded the opinions to Louis Loss,106 who was “literally appalled” by 
the majority opinion.107 Loss could “hardly think of anything more low-down than a paid 
investment adviser’s using his influence with his clients to feather his own nest.”108 Clark 
took comfort in Loss’s endorsement of his position, but soon enough he would get an 
even more authoritative vote of confidence.109 
                                                 
101 Capital Gains, 306 F.2d at 611-612 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 612. 
103 Id. at 614. 
104 Id. at 615. 
105 Id. at 619. 
106 Letter of Charles E. Clark to Professor Louis Loss, (July 31, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 
55, Folder 262. 
107 Letter of Louis Loss to Charles E. Clark, (December 17, 1962), Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, 
Folder 262. 
108 Id. 
109 Capital Gains was closely followed back in the Second Circuit, with District Court Judge 
William Timbers, formerly General Counsel at the SEC, providing Clark with updates on the case’s 
progress in the Supreme Court. See Handwritten Note from William H. Timbers to Judge Clark, (9/20/--) 
(advising Clark that SEC had authorized certiorari petition and was awaiting approval from the Solicitor 
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III. The Supreme Court 
After the knock-down, drag-out fight in the Second Circuit, the course of Capital 
Gains in the Supreme Court was surprisingly tame. Five justices voted to grant 
certiorari,110 with Chief Justice Warren expressing concern that the Second Circuit “ha[d] 
gone overboard in its opinion and gives aid + comfort to sharp dealers.”111 The result was 
lopsided, with only Justice John Marshall Harlan voting to affirm. 
Justice Arthur Goldberg was assigned the opinion. Goldberg’s initial circulation 
did not emphasize the investment adviser’s status as a fiduciary.112 The language relating 
to fraud by fiduciaries was added in response to a letter from Justice Byron White, who 
suggested that,  
the treatment might be stronger if the investment adviser may be looked upon as a 
fiduciary ... and if the content of fraud and deceit as applied to a fiduciary is 
considered. ... If the fiduciary has a settled duty to disclose and if his failure to do 
so is termed fraudulent, there was little need for Congress in dealing with the 
fiduciary in the Investment Advisers Act to speak of anything but fraud in order to 
reach a failure to disclose a material fact or at the very least a conflict of 
interest.113 
                                                                                                                                                 
General); Memo from WHT to CEC, (12/3/1962) (advising Clark that SEC had filed certiorari petition); 
Letter from William H. Timbers to Hon. Charles E. Clark (1/21/1963) (advising Clark that certiorari had 
been granted), Charles E. Clark Papers, Series II, Box 55, Folder 262. 
110 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, No. 42, Docket Sheet (January 18, 1963) (“Grant: 
Goldberg, White, Douglas, Black, C.J.”), Earl Warren Collection, Box 378, Library of Congress. 
111 Handwritten Notes, Cert. Memo, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, No. 42 (Undated), 
Earl Warren Collection, Box 247, Library of Congress. 
112 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, First Circulation (Nov. 27, 1963), Arthur Goldberg 
Collection, Box 17, Folder 3, Northwestern University Library. 
113 Letter from Byron R. White to Arthur Goldberg, Re: No. 42 – SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau (December 2, 1963), Arthur Goldberg Collection, Box 17, Folder 3, Northwestern University 
Library. 
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In other words, the Second Circuit majority had gotten the case wrong not because it 
restricted § 206 to common law fraud, but rather, because material nondisclosure by a 
fiduciary was fraud per se. If the investment adviser was treated as fiduciary, the common 
law (or at least equity) did not need to be stretched to treat non-disclosure as 
fraudulent.114 No specific mention of omissions in § 206 would be required, nor would 
rulemaking. 
Goldberg quickly latched on to White’s suggestion, revising his opinion to 
emphasize the relation between fiduciary status and fraud:  
Nor is it necessary, in a suit against a fiduciary, which Congress recognized the 
investment adviser to be, to establish all the elements required in a suit against a 
party to an arms-length transaction. Courts have imposed on a fiduciary an 
affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts.’115  
Notable here is the lack of analysis underlying the conclusion that investment advisers 
are fiduciaries.116 Notwithstanding Goldberg’s breezy treatment of this issue, the holding 
                                                                                                                                                 
White was relying upon the research of his law clerk, Rex Lee, as the basis for his suggestions. 
See REL, Memo, No. 42 OT 1963, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Concealment by a fiduciary as 
fraud, Byron R. White Collection, Box 35, Folder 6, Library of Congress (“Early cases in this Court .. 
indicate by dictum that  a fiduciary or one who occupies a special relation to another, commits fraud when 
he fails to disclose a material fact.”). Lee would come to play a role again in the development of insider 
trading law, when as Solicitor General, he would urge the Supreme Court to reverse the SEC’s broad view 
of tipper-tippee liability. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
114 On the status of investment advisers as fiduciaries, see Laby, supra note 38, at 1066-1078. 
115 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Second Circulation, at 14 (Dec. 4, 1963), Arthur 
Goldberg Collection, Box 17, Folder 3, Northwestern University Library (citations omitted). 
116 James R. Ukropina, The Investment Advisers Act and the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of its 
Anti-Fraud Provisions, 37 S. Cal. L.Rev. 359, 362 (1964) (“A more relevant inquiry from the outset might 
have been to ask whether or not a subscriber to a market letter costing $18 a year should be considered to 
have entered into a fiduciary relationship when he pays his subscription price. Further discussion of this 
issue would seem warranted since disputes still exist in tort law as to the nature of many relationships and 
the consequential necessity for disclosure”). 
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here would become the germ of the insider trading prohibition that the Court would later 
recognize under § 10(b).  
Having used equity to free § 206 from the common law constraints that the lower 
courts had imposed on it, Goldberg announced an interpretive canon that was surely 
music to William Cary’s ears: “Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
to be construed like other securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding 
frauds, not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.” 117  Having adopted this flexible/remedial interpretive canon from Clark’s 
dissent, Goldberg brushed aside the differences between § 17(a) of the Securities Act and 
§ 206 of the Investment Advisers Act: “Congress, in enacting [§ 206] ... deemed a 
specific proscription against nondisclosure surplusage.”118 Clark’s ultimate victory over 
Friendly was secured; it seemed that statutory text could be overcome by the 
flexible/remedial interpretive canon. It remained to be seen whether that canon would be 
generally applied when interpreting the securities laws. 
IV. The influence of Capital Gains 
Capital Gains’ interpretive approach would find fertile ground in the Second 
Circuit. Clark died in 1963 – just four days after Capital Gains was handed down by the 
Supreme Court119 – but other judges took up the SEC’s cause.  Four years later, in SEC v. 
                                                 
117 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (citations and quotations omitted). 
118 Id. at 198-199. 
119 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 45. 
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Texas Gulf Sulfur, Judge Waterman would write for the majority of the Second Circuit 
validating the SEC’s expansive reading of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.120 Capital Gains 
would be cited by the Texas Gulf Sulfur majority for the proposition that even negligent 
insider trading would be unlawful.121 Capital Gains was cited not only for that particular 
proposition of law, but also for the flexible/remedial interpretive presumption: “the 
securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law ... to effectuate 
the remedial design of Congress.”122 Friendly was forced by the precedential weight of 
Capital Gains to concede that negligence would suffice in an SEC suit seeking injunctive 
relief, but he fought a rearguard action (which he would eventually win) against allowing 
suits for money damages without a showing of scienter.123 Lumbard and Moore found 
themselves in dissent, forced to give lip service to Capital Gains’ flexible/remedial 
interpretive canon, but refusing to follow it to its logical conclusion.124 Nonetheless, 
Chairman Cary’s broad approach to insider trading in Cady, Roberts now had been 
validated by the most important circuit court for securities law. 
The Supreme Court’s first citation to Capital Gains was equally promising for the 
SEC. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
cited Capital Gains for the proposition that “Congress intended securities legislation 
enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not technically and 
                                                 
120 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
121 Id. at 855. 
122 Id. 
123 Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 864, 868 (Friendly, J., concurring). 
124 Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 870 (Moore, J., dissenting, joined by Lumbard, C.J.). 
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restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.’”125 The flexible/remedial 
interpretation in Affiliated Ute allowed the Court to excuse proof of reliance under Rule 
10b-5 in cases “involving primarily a failure to disclose.”126 Thus, the Supreme Court 
took another step toward validating an insider trading prohibition under the rubric of Rule 
10b-5. 
Headwinds soon arose for the flexible/remedial principle, however, with the 
appointment of Lewis Powell to the Supreme Court.127 The SEC cited Capital Gains 
flexible/remedial principle in its brief in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.128 
Powell ignored Capital Gains in drafting his majority opinion; it is cited by Justice 
Brennan in his dissent.129 The case was cited again by the SEC the following term as 
supporting a negligence standard for § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.130  Powell, again 
writing for the Court, rejected flexible interpretation of the securities laws in light “of the 
language of § 10(b), which so clearly connotes intentional misconduct.” 131  Justice 
                                                 
125 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). Justice Douglas asserts the same proposition in Superintendent of 
Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, 
not technically and restrictively.”), but he provides no citation. 
126 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153. 
127 Powell was only recently appointed to the Court at the time Affiliated Ute was decided and he 
did not participate in the decision. Id. at 157. On Powell’s resistance to the SEC’s efforts to expand the 
boundaries of the securities law, see generally A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counter-
Revolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841 (2003). 
128  Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, Nos. 74-157 and 74-647, at 10-11. 
129 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 867-868 (1975) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
130 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976). 
131 Id. at 201. 
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Blackmun, in dissent, cited Capital Gains and his own opinion in Affiliated Ute for the 
principle of flexible/remedial interpretation.132 
A pattern was set. The SEC would cite Capital Gains in support of a broad 
interpretation of the securities laws, and the Supreme Court – under the influence of 
Justice Powell – would brush it aside, insisting that the language of the statute would not 
support the interpretation.133 The conflict over this interpretive principle between the 
conservative and liberal blocs of the Court would come to a head in two cases from the 
October 1979 term.  
The first case, Chiarella v. United States,134 laid the groundwork for the Court’s 
insider trading jurisprudence under § 10(b). Justice Powell, writing for the Court, 
construed Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur and its progeny in the Second Circuit 
narrowly, fitting those decisions into the common law framework that Powell favored.135 
More gallingly to Blackmun, Powell read Affiliated Ute as imposing “liability premised 
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties 
to a transaction.”136 After reading Powell’s draft opinion, Blackmun wrote to his law 
clerk, “I think it advisable, also, to point out, if it is the case, that Justice Powell is giving 
a narrowing interpretation to Affiliated Ute Citizens. I wrote that opinion, and I certainly 
                                                 
132 Id. at 217. Blackmun had also cited Capital Gains the previous term in dissent.  See Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
133 See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475 & n. 15 (1977) (distinguishing 
Capital Gains on the ground that the case involved deceptive non-disclosure). 
134 445 US 222 (1980). 
135 A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the 
Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L.Rev. 13 (1998). 
136 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
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don’t want it unduly narrowed.”137  In his first draft of his dissent, Blackmun wrote “It 
seems to me that with its decision in this case the Court continues its emasculation of § 
10(b) ... I, of course, have been unsuccessful in my attempts to stop this trend.”138 This 
defeatist language did not make it into the final version of Blackmun’s dissent, but the 
published version did little to disguise his bitterness. 
The Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions, 
designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic “catchall” provision to 
one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes 
investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor. ... 
[T]he Court fails even to attempts a justification of its ruling in terms of the 
purposes of the securities laws, or to square that ruling with the long-standing but 
now much abused principle that the federal securities laws are to be construed 
flexibly rather than with narrow technicality.139 
Blackmun argued that his Affiliated Ute opinion gave “strong support to the principle that 
a structural disparity in access to material information is a critical factor under Rule 10b-
5 in establishing a duty either to disclose the information or to abstain from trading.”140 
This is the parity of information theory that the SEC had been pushing – successfully – in 
the Second Circuit. Under Capital Gains flexible interpretive approach, Affiliated Ute 
probably would have been read as Blackmun favored. The Supreme Court, however, was 
now under the sway of Justice Powell in the field of securities law. Powell favored the 
technical and restrictive interpretation rejected by Capital Gains, notwithstanding the 
                                                 
137 Memo from HAB to Mark, No. 78-1202 – Chiarella v. United States (2/4/80), Harry Blackmun 
Papers, Library of Congress. 
138 Id. 
139 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246-247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
140 Id. at 251. 
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concessions he made to Capital Gains’ equitable notions of fraud in framing the more 
limited insider trading prohibition under § 10(b) in Chiarella. 
 The second securities case of the term, Aaron v. SEC,141 rejected Capital Gains’ 
interpretive principle even more emphatically. Aaron raised the question of the state of 
mind required under § 10(b) in an SEC enforcement action seeking injunctive relief. 
Again the SEC urged the Court to follow Capital Gains and not require a showing of 
intent.142 The Court demurred, distinguishing Capital Gains on the grounds that § 206’s 
language and legislative history differed from § 10(b)’s.143 Moreover, the Aaron Court 
was explicit in rejecting Capital Gains’ flexible/remedial interpretive principle:  
“generalized references to the remedial purposes of the securities laws will not justify 
reading a provision more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably 
permit.” 144  Blackmun was again in dissent, unpersuaded by the Court’s attempt to 
distinguish Capital Gains.145 
 Not much was left of Capital Gains at this point, but Powell wanted to go further, 
completely purging it from the judicial lexicon. The following term, in a case involving 
the definition of a sale under the Securities Act,146 Powell offered to join Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion for the majority if the Chief would refrain from citing 
                                                 
141 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
142 Id. at 693. 
143 Id. at 694. 
144 Id. at 695. 
145 Id. at 703, 705-710 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
146 Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981). 
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the 1963 case of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, quoting language to the 
effect that federal security laws must be construed “not technically and 
restrictively but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.” 
A number of more recent decisions, for example, Hochfelder relied on by your 
opinion, have looked primarily to the plain language of the securities acts. These 
are highly technical and well drawn statutes, and as you make clear by the 
remainder of your opinion this case falls within the explicit language of §§2(3) 
and 17(a). Thus, the quote from Capital Gains Research Bureau is unnecessary 
and perhaps could be viewed as undercutting to some extent your reliance on the 
statutory language itself.147   
Chief Justice Burger excised the offensive language from Capital Gains.148 
Powell had won a minor victory, but he had not yet put a stake through the heart 
of Capital Gains’ flexible/remedial principle. Two terms later, in a case in which Powell 
did not participate, Justice Thurgood Marshall cited Capital Gains.149 And the term after 
Powell retired, Blackmun referred to the flexible/remedial principle in interpreting § 
12(a)(1) of the Securities Act.150 Blackmun went on, however, to ground the decision in 
the statutory language, rejecting the broader interpretation adopted by the court of 
appeals. After that passing reference, nearly fifteen years would go by before Justice 
Stevens would cite Capital Gains for the flexible/remedial interpretive principal, in a 
                                                 
147 Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jan. 8, 1981), 
Powell Archives, Washington & Lee Law Library. 
148 Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Jan. 8, 1981) 
Powell Archives, Washington & Lee Law Library. 
149 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (citing Capital Gains) and id. at 391 
(Powell not participating). 
150 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) 
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case involving insider trading.151 Stevens’ invocation did not mark a revival; Capital 
Gains has not been cited by the Supreme Court since. 
V. Conclusion 
Capital Gains made two important innovations in the Supreme Court’s securities 
jurisprudence. The first was that a statutory anti-fraud provision could incorporate, 
without specific reference, duties of disclosure owed by fiduciaries to their beneficiaries.  
The second was the interpretive principle that the securities laws are to be flexibly 
construed to achieve their remedial objectives. The first contribution has survived as part 
of insider trading law, accepted unreservedly by Justice Blackmun in Affiliated Ute and 
more grudgingly by Justice Powell in Chiarella. The second contribution has not fared as 
well despite Justice Blackmun’s adoption of it in Affiliated Ute. Interpretation of the 
securities laws was cabined by the Supreme Court, primarily Justice Powell, as the Court 
resisted the efforts of the SEC and private plaintiffs to expand their reach. Powell’s 
successors on the Court have been no more generous with their interpretation. The 
flexible/remedial principle survives – if it does survive – only as a ritual incantation 
before proceeding to parse precisely the terms of the statute at issue. 
Why has the flexible/remedial principle fared so poorly of late? The easy answer 
is that the Supreme Court has become more conservative since its heady Warren Court 
days. A more critical answer is that the principle lacks analytical content. The principle 
could be rephrased simply as “SEC wins” and it would be just as useful. It does not 
                                                 
151 SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002). 
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provide a court with any guidance in attempting to discern the outer boundaries of the 
SEC’s authority. Unless a court is willing to cede the SEC unlimited authority, “flexible” 
interpretation offers no help in deciding concrete cases. 
Statutory language, the “technical” tool of choice for Justice Powell and his 
successors, offers something tangible, something judicial, for a judge to work with. To be 
sure, policy preferences may be lurking just below the surface. That preference for 
grounding results in statutory text may be unsatisfying for those dissatisfied with the 
reluctance of Congress to provide meaningful guidance in controversial areas such as 
insider trading. And it would surely be unsatisfying for New Dealers like Charles Clark 
and William O. Douglas, who put their faith in the expertise of administrative agencies 
like the SEC. For the foreseeable future, however, do not expect the Supreme Court to 
revive Capital Gains as a substitute for legislation and rulemaking in the field of 
securities law. 
34
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 68 [2012]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/68
